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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
LAYTON CITY/ ] 
Plaintiff-Respondent/ ] 
-vs-
BILLY E. NOON, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
I REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
i Docket No. 860493 
1
 Category No. 2 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Points III and IV of plaintiff-respondent's 
(hereinafter referred to as "Layton City") brief/ concerning 
the proper function of the trier of fact in a trial and this 
Court's standard of review are inapplicable to the points 
raised in defendant-appellant's (hereinafter referred to as 
"defendant"), opening brief concerning lack of probable cause 
to make an arrest and ineffective assistance of counsel* The 
appropriate standards for review were set forth in 
defendant's principal brief and are discussed below again. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant agrees with Layton City's statement that 
the trier of fact may make reasonable inferences based on the 
direct evidence [Respondent's Brief at 13, citing State v. 
Kazda, 15 Utah 2d 313, 392 P.2d 486 (1964) and State v. 
Maestas, 652 P.2d 903 (Utah 1982)], and that the appellate 
court must assume that the jury believed those aspects of the 
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evidence which support the verdict [Resp. Br. at 13/ citing 
State v. Smathers/ 602 P.2d 708/ 709 (Utah 1979]- However, 
these statements have no application where the issues raised 
on appeal are lack of probable cause for arrest and 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
With regard to Proposition IV, "Standard of Review" 
(Respondent's Brief at 13) defendant must point out that the 
cases cited by Layton City in support of the standard it 
proposes all deal with challenges to the sufficiency of the 
evidence to support the verdict/ not to the challenges raised 
in defendant's opening brief: lack of probable cause for 
arrest and ineffective assistance of counsel. See State v. 
Kerekes, 622 P.2d 1161, 1168 (Utah 1980), State v. Daniels, 
584 P.2d 880, 882-3 (Utah 1978), State v. Lairby, 699 P.2d 
1187, 1207 (Utah 1984), State v. Haro, 703 P.2d 301, 303 
(Utah 1985), State v. Howell, 649 P.2d 91, 97 (Utah 1982), 
State v. Brooks, 638 P.2d 537, 543 (Utah 1981). 
In deciding the existence of probable cause for 
arrest, this Court has stated: 
[t]he determination should be made on an objective 
standard: whether from the facts known to the 
officer, and the inferences which fairly might be 
drawn therefrom, a reasonable and prudent person in 
his position would be justified in believing that 
the suspect had committed the offense. 
State v. Hatcher, 27 Utah 2d 318, 495 P.2d 1259, 1260 (1972) 
(fn. omitted) (emphasis added). Since the determination is 
made based on "facts known to the officer" at the time of the 
arrest [Hatcher, supra, 495 P.2d at 1260; People v. Severson, 
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561 P.2d 373, 375 (Colo. App. 1977)], facts later adduced by 
the officer or revealed at trial are irrelevant. In 
addition, whether probable cause existed is a question of law 
to be decided by the trial court, not the trier of fact, and 
the standard of review is whether the trial court erred in 
its determination. State v. Eastmond, 28 Utah 2d 129, 499 
P.2d 276, 278 (1972). See Brief of Appellant at 5-7 for a 
discussion as to why probable cause for arrest did not exist. 
Ineffective assistance of counsel is, of course, 
raised for the first time on appeal. In challenging a 
conviction on this basis, 
it is the defendant's burden to show (1) that his 
counsel rendered a deficient performance in some 
demonstrable manner, and (2) that the outcome of 
the trial would probably have been different but 
for counsel's error. 
State v. Geary, 707 P.2d 645, 646 (Utah 1985) (citations 
omitted). This statement thus sets forth both defendant's 
burden and the appropriate standard for review on appeal. 
It is obvious that the jury in this case felt that 
it had been presented with sufficient evidence to find 
defendant guilty. However, the issue on appeal is whether 
the same verdict would have been reached but for counsel's 
errors. "[A] verdict or conclusion only weakly supported by 
the record is more likely to have been affected by errors 
than one with overwhelming record support." Strickland v. 
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 696, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 
674 (1984). Defendant presented several instances of 
ineffective assistance of counsel in his opening 
-3-
brief and discussed how he was prejudiced thereby. App. Br. 
at 7-10. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the arguments in defendant's opening 
brief and the above reply to respondent's brief/ defendant 
urges this Court to find that the errors complained of 
require reversal of his conviction. 
Respectfully submitted ££is 1 M " day of January/ 
1987. 
Margo L. y/ames 
Attorneys for Defendant-Appellant 
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